A report on preparation, expansion and future outlook of COVID-19 testing in Gambia.

Background: The outbreak of COVID-19 disease and rapid spread of the virus outside China led to its declaration as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in January 2020. Key elements of the early intervention strategy focused on laboratory diagnosis and screening at points of entry and imposition of restrictions in crossborder activities. Objective: We report the role the Medical Research Council Unit, The Gambia (MRCG) played in the early implementation of molecular testing for COVID-19 in The Gambia as part of the national outbreak response. Methods: Laboratory staff members, with experience in molecular biology assays, were identified and trained on COVID-19 testing at the Africa CDC training workshop in Dakar, Senegal. Thereafter risks assessments, drafting of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and inhouse training enabled commencement of testing using commercial RTPCR kits. Subsequently, testing was expanded to the National Public Health Laboratroy and also implemented across field sites for rapid response across the country. Results: Capacity for COVID-19 testing at MRCG was developed and can process aproximately 350 tests per day, which can be further scaled up as the demand for testing increases. Conclusion: The long presence of the Unit in The Gambia and strong collaborative relationship with the National Health Ministry, allowed for a synergistc approach in mounting an effective response that contributed in delaying the establishment of community transmission in the country.

Intense and Mild First Epidemic Wave of Coronavirus Disease, The Gambia.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic is evolving differently in Africa than in other regions. Africa has lower SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates and milder clinical manifestations. Detailed SARS-CoV-2 epidemiologic data are needed in Africa. We used publicly available data to calculate SARS-CoV-2 infections per 1,000 persons in The Gambia. We evaluated transmission rates among 1,366 employees of the Medical Research Council Unit The Gambia (MRCG), where systematic surveillance of symptomatic cases and contact tracing were implemented. By September 30, 2020, The Gambia had identified 3,579 SARS-CoV-2 cases, including 115 deaths; 67% of cases were identified in August. Among infections, MRCG staff accounted for 191 cases; all were asymptomatic or mild. The cumulative incidence rate among nonclinical MRCG staff was 124 infections/1,000 persons, which is >80-fold higher than estimates of diagnosed cases among the population. Systematic surveillance and seroepidemiologic surveys are needed to clarify the extent of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in Africa.

Beyond SARS-CoV-2: Lessons That African Governments Can Apply in Preparation for Possible Future Epidemics.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has placed unprecedented pressure on healthcare systems, even in advanced economies. While the number of cases of SARS-CoV-2 in Africa compared to other continents has so far been low, there are concerns about under-reporting, inadequate diagnostic tools, and insufficient treatment facilities. Moreover, proactiveness on the part of African governments has been under scrutiny. For instance, issues have emerged regarding the responsiveness of African countries in closing international borders to limit trans-continental transmission of the virus. Overdependence on imported products and outsourced services could have contributed to African governments' hesitation to shut down international air and seaports. In this era of emerging and re-emerging pathogens, we recommend that African nations should consider self-sufficiency in the health sector as an urgent priority, as this will not be the last outbreak to occur. In addition to the Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement fund (US$600 million) provided by the World Bank for strengthening health systems and disease surveillance, each country should further establish an epidemic emergency fund for epidemic preparedness and response. We also recommend that epidemic surveillance units should create a secure database of previous and ongoing pandemics in terms of aetiology, spread, and treatment, as well as financial management records. Strategic collection and analysis of data should also be a central focus of these units to facilitate studies of disease trends and to estimate the scale of requirements in preparation and response to any future pandemic or epidemic.